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Abstract—Integer overflows have threatened software applications for decades. Thus, in this paper, we propose a novel technique to
provide automatic repair of integer overflows in C source code. Our technique, based on static symbolic execution, fuses detection,
repair generation and validation. This technique is implemented in a prototype named INTREPAIR. We applied INTREPAIR to 2,052 C
programs (approx. 1 million lines of code) contained in SAMATE’s Juliet test suite and 50 synthesized programs that range up to 20
KLOC. Our experimental results show that INTREPAIR is able to effectively detect integer overflows and successfully repair them,
while only increasing the source code (LOC) and binary (Kb) size by around 1%, respectively. Furthermore, we present the results of a
user study with 30 participants showing that INTREPAIR repairs are more efficient than manual repairs.
Index Terms—Program repair, source code refactoring, integer overflow, software bug, symbolic execution, static program analysis;
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Integer overflows are a well-known cause of memory
corruptions, and a widely known type of vulnerability [52]
that has threatened programs for decades. To address this
challenge, it has been, for example, proposed to apply the
concept of automatic repair [38] to fix integer overflows.
This idea consists of employing a system that produces code
patches in order to fix integer overflows. In the past, im-
portant milestones [24], [45], [47] towards automatic repair
of integer overflows have been reached: SoupInt [50] is a
runtime-based binary patch generator, CodePhage [47] is a
code transfer system at the binary level, and Sift [24] is a
static input filter generator which needs access to the source
code and binary code of the repaired program. However,
these integer overflow repair tools either: (1) introduce a
high runtime overhead after the program was repaired, or
(2) do not validate whether the generated patches are correct
and program behavior is not changed in an unwanted
manner.
In this paper, we tackle these two problems in a novel
system, INTREPAIR, usable for automatic repair of integer
overflows. Our key idea is to use symbolic execution [1],
[4], [5], [25], [51] to reason about the repair. In particular,
our intuition is two-fold: (1) we fuse the fault localization
and repair generation phases into a single algorithm via
SMT solving, and (2) we ensure that the resulting repairs
do not insert unwanted program behavior with symbolic
reasoning. We present a novel integer overflow repair tech-
nique that operationalizes this idea and the corresponding
prototype tool, INTREPAIR. To the best of our knowledge,
INTREPAIR is the first approach for automated repair of
integer overflow that does not require test cases.
Given a buggy program, INTREPAIR generates a SMT
system that captures integer overflow manifestation and
allows for correct patch generation and validation. This is
achieved by interweaving the bug detection SMT constraints
with newly synthesized constraints used for correct bug
generation. Patch Correctness: The repairs generated by
INTREPAIR are correct in the sense that the repair correctly
removes the bug and does not change program behavior.
Patch Validation: By validation, we mean that the generated
synthesized patches are guaranteed to be correct. As such:
(1) the automatically generated patches are not program
input dependent, (2) the generated patch removes the de-
tected integer overflow on all program execution paths that
reach the fault location, and (3) the patches do not introduce
unwanted program behavior (i.e., only the integer overflow
is removed). The integer overflow detection checker on
which INTREPAIR relies does not generate false negatives
(i.e., every detected integer overflow is a genuine integer
overflow). Further, we do not distinguish between intended
or unintended integer overflows, yet false positives may
happen due to certain implementation limitations, such as
loop unrolling or recursion depth.
The implementation of INTREPAIR is built upon the Co-
dan static symbolic execution engine [21], [22], [40]. It uses
the Z3 SMT solver [12] to solve the extracted constraints.
Note, that our repair generation technique is general enough
to be implemented on top of other symbolic execution
engines as well.
We evaluated INTREPAIR on 2,052 C programs contained
in the SAMATE’s C/C++ benchmark suite [49], totaling
more than one million lines of code (LOC). The evaluated
programs contain all possible program control flows that
may lead to an integer overflow. Further, we use a syn-
thesized benchmark containing 50 large C programs (up to
20 KLOC) seeded with integer overflows. Our experimen-
tal results show that INTREPAIR is able to: (1) effectively
detect all integer overflows, and (2) successfully repair the
programs at the source code level. In addition, we present
the results of a user study with 30 participants showing
that INTREPAIR is effective compared to traditional manual
repair. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other
open source tools with which we can compare against. In
particular, DirectFix [26], Angelix [27], or SemFix [42] are
not suitable for comparison purposes as these tools use test
cases to locate the fault: on the contrary, we do not assume
the presence of test cases.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Novel Integer Overflow Repair Technique. We de-
signed a novel source code repair generation tech-
nique for integer overflows in C programs.
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• Repair Tool. We implemented INTREPAIR, as a pro-
totype of our novel integer overflow repairing tech-
nique, for C source code programs. It can be au-
tomatically used to repair integer overflows across
multiple integer precisions.
• Quantitative Evaluation. We evaluated INTREPAIR
thoroughly with 2,052 C programs contained in the
currently largest open-source test suite for C/C++
source code (NSA’s Juliet) and with 50 synthesized
programs which range up to 20 KLOC. We show that
INTREPAIR’s code repairs are effective and induce
low runtime overhead.
• Controlled Experiment. We evaluated INTREPAIR
within a controlled experiment with 30 participants
and determined that our tool is more time-effective
than repairing the same programs manually.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we present the required background
knowledge needed in order to understand the rest of this
paper. In Section 3, we highlight design and implemen-
tation details of INTREPAIR, while In Section 4, we eval-
uate INTREPAIR, and in Section 5, we discuss limitations
of INTREPAIR. In Section 6, we review related work, and
in Section 7, we offer concluding remarks.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Before presenting the technical details of our approach, we
highlight the necessary background information required to
better understand the rest of the paper.
2.1 Integer Overflows
Integer overflow is a known cause of memory corruption
and a widely known type of vulnerability [52]. It often leads
to stack or heap overflow and thus is usually exploited
indirectly (as opposed to buffer overflows which are ex-
ploited directly). More specifically, integer overflows occur
at runtime, when the result of an integer expression exceeds
the maximum allowed value (e.g., 232 − 1).
• Repair Tool. We implemented INTREPAIR, as a pro-
totype of our novel integer overflow repairing tech-
nique, for C source code programs. It can be au-
tomatically used to repair integer overflows across
multiple integer precisions.
• Quantitative Evaluation. We evaluated INTREPAIR
thoroughly with 2,052 C programs contained in the
currently largest open-source test suite for C/C++
source code (NSA’s Juliet) and with 50 synthesized
programs which range up to 20 KLOC. We show that
INTREPAIR’s code repairs are effective and induce
low runtime verhead.
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paper. In Section 3, we highlight design and implemen-
tation details of INTREPAIR, while In Section 4, we eval-
uate INTREPAIR, and in Section 5, we discuss limitations
of INTREPAIR. In Section 6, we review related work, and
in Section 7, we offer concluding remarks.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Before presenting the technical details of our approach, we
highlight the necessary background information required to
better understand the rest of the paper.
2.1 Integer Overflows
Integer overflow is a known cause of memory corruption
and a widely known type of vulnerability [52]. It often leads
to stack or heap overflow and thus is usually exploited
indirec ly (as pposed to buffer overflows which are ex-
ploited directly). More specifically, integer overflows occur
at runtime, when the result of an integer expression exceeds
the maximum allowed value (e.g., 232 − 1).
1 int64_t data = 0LL;
2 //Potential flaw: use random value
3 data = (int64_t)RAND64();
4 if(data > 0){
5 /* Potential flaw: if (data*2)>
6 LLONG_MAX, this will overflow */
7 int64_t result = data * 2;
8 printLongLongLine(result);}
Fig. 1: Integer overflow shaded gray at line seven.
Figure 1 depicts an integer overflow memory corruption
at line number 7, which could manifest because there is no
proper check in place for verifying the range of admissi-
ble values for data. This integer overflow (and potential
underflow) error can be avoided by checking the value of
data to see if it is less than or equal to LLONG_MAX_V AL2 =
4.611.686.018.427.387.903 ≈ 418 and greater than or equal
to −LLONG_MAX_V AL2 .
2.1.1 Characteristics of Integer Overflows
Integer overflows can be classified as malicious or benign.
Essentially, an integer overflow manifests itself, when the
program receives user-supplied input and subsequently the
input value is used in an arithmetic operation to trigger
an integer overflow. Thus, a smaller than expected value is
supplied to the memory allocation function and as a result
a smaller than expected memory will be allocated. Deciding
between the types of integer overflow related problems is
rather difficult and a lot of research has been devoted in
the last years to this type of classification [48]. The general
desire in the research community is to categorize different
hard to find integer overflows w.r.t. how exploit-prone these
are in contrast to just finding and repairing them.
2.1.2 Integer Overflow Related Problems
There are several integer overflow related problems that
we will next list and briefly describe. CWE-191, integer
underflow (wrap or wrap-around) [30], is the result of
multiplying two values with each other and the result is less
than the minimum admissible integer value due to the fact
that the product subtracts one value from another. CWE-
192, integer coercion error [29], manifests during bad type
casting and extension or truncation of primitive data types.
CWE-193, off-by-one error [33], manifests during product
calculation/usage; an incorrect maximum/minimum value
is used which is one more, or one less, than the correct
value. CWE-194, unexpected sign extension [35], appears
when an operation performed on a number can cause it to
be sign-extended when it is transformed into a larger data
type. CWE-195, signed to unsigned conversion error [34],
manifests when a signed primitive that is used inside a cast
to an unsigned primitive can produce an unexpected result
if the value of the signed primitive cannot be represented
using an unsigned primitive. CWE-196, unsigned to signed
conversion error [36], manifests when an unsigned is used
inside a cast to a signed primitive, which can produce an
unexpected value if the result of the unsigned primitive
cannot be represented using a signed primitive. CWE-197,
numeric truncation error [32], manifests when a primitive
is casted to a primitive of a smaller size and data is lost
in the conversion. CWE-680, integer overflow to buffer
overflow [31], appears when an integer overflow occurs that
causes less memory to be allocated than expected, which can
lead to a buffer overflow.
2.2 Symbolic Execution Engine
This paper uses a symbolic execution approach for fault
detection and repair generation. A symbolic execution en-
gine [40], [41] constructs a control flow graph (CFG) for each
analyzed program and extracts execution paths. Constraints
along the execution path are encoded into SMT equations,
using the SMT-LIB format SMT-LIB [2]. The translation of
CFG nodes into SMT is performed by a translator algorithm,
which extends the program’s abstract syntax tree (AST) visi-
tor class, according to the visitor pattern [18]. This is usually
based on a bottom-up traversal of each program statement
located on the currently analyzed program execution path.
In our work, we use the Codan static symbolic execution
engine [21], [22], [40]. In Codan, single static assignment
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Fig. 1: Inte overflow shaded gray at line numb r en.
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manifests when a signed primitive that is used inside a cast
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if the value of the signed primitive cannot be represented
using an unsigned primitive. CWE-196, unsigned to signed
conversion error [36], manifests when an unsigned is used
inside a cast to a signed primitive, which can produce an
unexpected value if the result of the unsigned primitive
cannot be represented using a signed primitive. CWE-197,
numeric truncation error [32], manifests when a primitive
is casted to a primitive of a smaller size and data is lost
in the conversion. CWE-680, integer overflow to buffer
overflow [31], appears when an integer overflow occurs that
causes less memory to be allocated than expected, which can
lead to a buffer overflow.
2.2 Symbolic Execution Engine
This paper uses a symbolic execution approach for fault
detection and repair gene ation. A symbolic execution en-
gine [40], [41] constructs a control flow graph (CFG) for each
analyzed program and extracts execution paths. Constraints
along the execution path are encoded into SMT equations,
using the SMT-LIB format SMT-LIB [2]. The translation of
CFG nodes into SMT is performed by a translator algorithm,
which extends the program’s abstract syntax tree (AST) visi-
tor class, according to the visitor pattern [18]. This is usually
based on a bottom-up traversal of each program statement
located on the currently analyzed program execution path.
In our work, we use the Codan s atic symbolic execution
engine [21], [22], [40]. In Codan, single static assignment
2
(SSA) variables are created for C expressions, which are as-
sociated with no variables in the analyzed program. Before
creating a new variable, the interpreter checks whether there
is already a symbolic variable. Further, for all SMT formulas
created for a particular program statement, one symbolic
variable is created for each of the variables contained in
the original program statement. Next, a single path is ex-
tracted from the previously computed CFG and traversed.
In Codan: (1) loops can be traversed a configurable number
of times, (2) the analysis can be customized to look, for
example, for the first N faults located on the currently
analyzed program path, and (3) Codan performs path-
caching and backtracking traversal, which avoids traversing
the whole program path from the beginning and collecting
all constraints again. Codan uses the Z3 [12] solver as its
backend in order to solve SMT constraints.
3 INTREPAIR: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In Section 3.1, we present the architecture of INTREPAIR,
and in Section 3.2, we present the supported overflow
and underflow checks, while in Section 3.3, we introduce
INTREPAIR’s fault localization algorithm. In Section 3.4, we
depict several of the repair patterns of INTREPAIR, and
in Section 3.5, we present the repair generation algorithm,
while in Section 3.6, we highlight implementation details.
Finally, in Section 3.7, we describe how INTREPAIR was
integrated and can be used inside an IDE.
3.1 Overview
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Fig. 2: INTREPAIR depicted as gray shaded boxes.
Figure 2 provides an overview of INTREPAIR showing its
main components. Initially, the 1 source code is passed into
the 2 symbolic execution engine, which first constructs a CFG
and then extracts all program execution paths. Constraints
are collected along these paths and 3 the integer overflow
detection component identifies whether an integer overflow
might occur for a given execution path. In 4 a repair pattern
is selected to fix the overflow. The 5 symbolic repair vali-
dation component checks whether the negated constraints
invalidate this integer overflow error. If this is the case,
6 the validated integer overflow repair is validated and a
7 targeted automatic repair is generated that removes the
previously detected integer overflow. After applying the
repair, we obtain the 8 patched source code, which is again
validated through 9 re-factored code validation. Further, in
case 3 integer overflow detection does not find an overflow,
INTREPAIR produces 10 a removed overflow, indicating that
the bug was successfully removed and 11 repaired source code
has been synthesized. Finally, in case the integer overflow
was not removed, then INTREPAIR produces 12 an unremoved
overflow, and the result is 13 unrepaired source code. Note,
that INTREPAIR checks for the introduction of unwanted
behavior after a patch was inserted by re-analyzing the
program with the help of symbolic execution and deciding
that no new bug was inserted. For verifying a patch after it
was applied, INTREPAIR does not require any test case since
the integer overflow component can decide if the bug was
removed. However, a test case can be used in conjunction
with the fault detection component in order to confirm that
the bug was removed from the source code location where
it was first detected before patching.
3.2 IntRepair Overflow and Underflow Checks
In the following, we present the three types of overflow
and underflow checks that are supported by INTREPAIR.
The checks are preconditions, as shown below. If one of the
preconditions evaluates to true, then an integer overflow
has been found [13].
First precondition. The addition of two integers, in
which one is a variable and the other is a positive constant,
will lead to an integer overflow if the following expression
evaluates to true: ((s1 > 0)∧(s1 > (INT_MAX−s2))). Note
that s2 is the positive constant.
Second precondition. The multiplication of two integers,
in which one is a variable and the other is negative, will lead
to an integer overflow or underflow if the following expres-
sion evaluates to true: ((s1 > 0) ∧ (s1 > (INT_MIN/s2))) ∨
((s1 < 0) ∧ (s1 < (INT_MAX/s2))). Note that s2 is the
negative constant.
Third precondition. The multiplication of two equal in-
tegers will lead to an integer overflow or underflow if the
following expression evaluates to true: ((s1 > 0) ∧ (s1 >
(sqrt(INT_MAX)))) ∨ ((s1 < 0) ∧ (s1 < (−sqrt(INT_MAX
)))). Note that s1 and s2 are the same variable.
The above preconditions are used over multiple types of
inputs for s1 or s2 (i.e., RAND32(), this is the wrapper for
the C random function, fscanf() etc.). The preconditions
can be applied over multiple integer precisions, meaning
that INT_MAX can take different values depending on the
currently used integer precision in the analyzed program.
We call this value the maximum admissible upper bound
value of an integer. This value is determined automatically
during program analysis. Further, the variables s1 or s2
can take different types: char, int64_t, int, short, un-
signed int. In contrast to IOC’s preconditions, which aim
to avoid an unconfirmed integer overflow during program
runtime, our preconditions help to guide repairs at the right
code location, where the integer overflow was detected and
confirmed. This results in avoiding the bug during runtime.
Note that we always use symbolic execution again as a last
step to confirm that the bug was completely fixed after a
repair was inserted.
Other operations, which may lead to integer overflows,
are: truncation, bit shifts and subtraction operations (see
Figure 6 in Pereira et al. [43] for more details). Currently,
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INTREPAIR does not support these operations, but we plan
to support them in an updated version of INTREPAIR.
3.3 Fault Localization
In order to generate code repairs, INTREPAIR initially needs
to detect the precise location where the integer overflow
resides in the program. This is the goal of INTREPAIR’s repair
location search algorithm, which we now present. First,
INTREPAIR constructs the CFG of the analyzed program.
Next, the following steps are performed consecutively in
order to detect a fault.
(1) Each program execution path is extracted from the
previously generated program CFG.
(2) The extracted path is traversed and path satisfiability
checks are performed at branch nodes.
(3) When INTREPAIR encounters an integer error prone
code location (i.e., assignment statement) on the analyzed
path, an integer overflow check is performed by notifying
the interpreter.
(4) The notification is delegated to the appropriate
checker (i.e., integer overflow checker) by the interpreter.
(5) The slice of SMT equations of the symbolic variable,
which potentially may overflow, together with correspond-
ing integer overflow satisfiability checks is queried by the
integer overflow checker.
(6) The check verifies if the symbolic variable, which
caused the integer overflow, can be greater (i.e., if this is true
then there is an integer overflow) than the currently used
integer upper bound value (i.e., INT_MAX). These upper
bound values are extracted from the C standard library con-
tained in the limits.h file. The lower bound is obtained
by negating the currently used upper bound value and and
adding one to the result.
(7) In case the SMT solver replies SAT (satisfiable, integer
overflow bug present) to the previously submitted SMT
query, then a problem report with problem ID (unique
system string, the ID refers to which checker detected the
bug), the file name where the bug was detected, and the line
number in the file where the bug is located will be created
and stored.
3.4 Repair Patterns
In this section, we present the repair patterns available in
INTREPAIR. We explain how these patterns can help to repair
integer overflows and how the patterns can produce correct
fixes. Repair patterns are stored in a decision tree. Note that
next we use a decision tree to depict the criteria needed
for choosing a repair pattern. Such a decision tree is pre-
viously, before the bug repair analysis is started, manually
constructed by the programmer and stored in a tree data
structure for later usage. The rationale behind the decision
tree is to help INTREPAIR to perform an time efficient search
for each detected fault and to pick a core repair that fits best.
Figure 3 depicts a decision tree used to show repair
patterns available to INTREPAIR. The series of dots indicate
other operations (i.e., subtraction, bit shift, etc.) or arrows
not depicted in this figure due to page constraints. Other
repair patterns for int64_t, int, short, and unsigned
int types are not depicted due to space limitations. C1
up to C24 represent the criteria needed by INTREPAIR for
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Fig. 3: Decision tree used for storing repair patterns.
choosing a repair pattern. A repair is selected when at least
two criteria are met. The six arrows on the left bottom
pointing up depict six repair patterns determined between
C1 and one of the criteria from C7 − C12. Depending on
whether one of the components of the analyzed statement
type x = y operator z; is a constant, a variable or a
variable with side effects (e.g., int z = i++; or short y
= foo();) a different repair pattern will be proposed.
More specifically, from top to bottom, the decision tree
contains an addition (left node) and a multiplication (right
node) operation that are used to determine the kind of
operation, which is performed in the buggy statement. At
the next level in the tree (top to bottom), the type of result
variable is determined. Further, at the next level in the tree,
it is determined if the parameters of the analyzed statement
are constants, variables or have side effects. Figure 3 depicts
in total 360 repair patterns (360 possibilities to combine two
criteria from the range C1 to C12 with each other, e.g., C1
and C8, see corresponding arrow in Figure 3) multiplied by
five (data types) and the result is then multiplied by two,
two main tree branches, e.g., add and multiply) for the C
statement type x = y operand z;.
INTREPAIR does ot s port these operations, but we plan
to support them in an updated version of INTREPAIR.
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choosing a repair pattern. A repair is selected when at least
two criteria are met. The six arrows on the left bottom
pointing up depict six repair patterns determined between
C1 and one of the criteria from C7 − C12. Depending on
whether one of the components of the analyzed statement
type x = y operator z; is a constant, a variable or a
variable with side effects (e.g., int z = i++; or short y
= foo();) a different repair pattern will be proposed.
More specifically, from top to bottom, the decision tree
contains an addition (left node) and a multiplication (right
node) operation that are used to determine the kind of
operation, which is performed in the buggy statement. At
the next level in the tree (top to bottom), the type of result
variable is determined. Further, at the next level in the tree,
it is determined if the parameters of the analyzed statement
are constants, variables or have side effects. Figure 3 depicts
in total 360 repair patterns (360 possibilities to combine two
criteria from the range C1 to C12 with each other, e.g., C1
and C8, see corresponding arrow in Figure 3) multiplied by
five (data types) and the result is then multiplied by two,
two main tree branches, e.g., add and multiply) for the C
statement type x = y operand z;.
Criteria Statement Repair Pattern Format Description
C15 &
C19
char a=y*y;
1 if(a > sqrt(INT_MAX) ||
2 a < -sqrt(INT_MAX)){log_or_die();}
3 else{...}
multiply
two equal
variables
C15 &
C17
char a=y*3;
1 if(a > INT_MAX/2 ||
2 a < INT_MIN/2){log_or_die();}
3 else{...}
multiply a
var. with a
const.
C3 & C7 char a=y+z;
1 if(a > INT_MAX/2 ||
2 a < INT_MIN/2){log_or_die();}
3 else{...}
add two vari-
ables
C3 & C11 char a=y+4; 1 if(a > INT_MAX-2){log_or_die();}2 else{...} add a vari-
able to a con-
stant
TABLE 1: Four repair patterns of INTREPAIR.
Table 1 depicts four notable repair patterns in more
detail. Note that for space reasons we omit the contents of
the if and else branches. The if branch contains the code
to log the occurrence of an integer overflow or the code
which terminates the execution of the program1. The else
branch contains a statement where the integer overflow was
detected.
Consider the C statement 544. a = b ∗ b; where an
integer overflow was detected at line number 544 in a
1. Note that terminating the program is an option that is not safe in
critical program executions, i.e., in case monetary transactions depend
on the program execution or when the program is driving a train, etc.
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Consider the C statement 544. a = b ∗ b; where an
integer overflow was detected at line number 544 in a
program’s source code file. In this case, the pattern depicted
in Figure 4 on row one (C15 & C19) will be used to
avoid the bug. This pattern will be selected based on the
fact that two equal variables are multiplied. As a result,
the statement will be surrounded with the code of the
pattern in which parts are replaced based on the type
of statement, 543. if(a <= sqrt(INT_MAX) || a <
−sqrt(INT_MAX)){545. log_or_die(); }546. else{ a =
b ∗ b; }. Note that the numbers (i.e., 543 up to 546) used in
this example represent the source code line numbers of the
repaired program, respectively.
How does a repair help to fix a bug? A generated repair
helps to fix a fault by providing to the programmer a
finished repair that contains complex mathematical con-
straints, which are not always obvious.
Why are the produced repairs correct? A produced repair is
correct w.r.t. to the definition of repair correctness given in
the Section 1, since after the repair generation and insertion
INTREPAIR checks if the fault was correctly removed and
if the program behavior was changed. Additionally, after
repair insertion, the whole program together with the repair
is recompiled; thus, semantic errors potentially caused by
the patch are in this way excluded.
Finally, note that building a repair is not straightfor-
ward, as the construction relies on complex mathematical
constraints that need to be inferred based on the currently
detected fault. Next, these constrains need to be carefully
plugged into each repair pattern in order to provide the
final patch.
3.5 Integer Overflow Repair Algorithm
The automated repair generation algorithm of INTREPAIR
consists of the following steps.
1) Determine the integer upper bound value;
2) Generate a SMT constraint system;
3) Select constraint values;
4) Re-compute the bound checking constraints;
5) Determine the bug type;
6) Select the repair pattern;
7) Determine the new constraint SMT system;
8) Generate code repair;
The algorithm corresponds to the box ¹ depicted in
Figure 2. These eight steps are performed in consecutive
order as highlighted next in the paper.
3.5.1 Determine Integer Upper Bound Value
In order to determine the currently used integer upper
bound value in the analyzed program, INTREPAIR performs
the following procedure, which allows INTREPAIR to be
a multi-precision tool in the sense that it automatically
determines the integer precision needed for each analyzed
program. First, INTREPAIR retrieves the hardware overflow
limits2 for each integer type. Second, during the symbolic
execution-based traversal of the analyzed program path,
INTREPAIR searches for previously defined and used integer
2. e.g., by parsing /usr/include/limits.h on Linux OS.
upper bound program variables. This search is realized by
comparing each declared or used variable name (e.g., data
in the code snippet) contained in the currently analyzed
program execution path with one of the supported integer
upper bound values (i.e., CHAR_MAX, INT_MAX, LLONG_-
MAX, SHORT_MAX, and UINT_MAX). Third, in case such an
upper bound value is found, it will be set to be the currently
used integer upper bound value. INTREPAIR can automat-
ically detect for each environment (system), in which it
runs, the currently used integer overflow upper bound limit
(i.e., INT_MAX) value. This way, the integer precision is
determined for each analyzed program individually. Next,
this upper bound value will be used for validating gener-
ated candidate code repairs and also to search for integer
overflows.
3.5.2 Generate a SMT Constraint System
Next, the symbolic variables and the constraints used inside
the integer overflow checker are grouped together and
stored for later processing. In particular, INTREPAIR stores:
(1) the statement where an integer overflow is detected, (2)
the SMT formula used to detect the bug in the first place,
(3) the bug ID of the integer overflow checker which was
used to detect the bug, (4) the symbolic variable which was
used to detect the integer overflow, and (5) other symbolic
variables on which the integer overflow triggering variable
may depend.
For instance, let us consider a C language assignment
statement int result = varA + varB; and its
SMT counterpart (assert (=resSymbolic ( +
varAsymbolic varBsymbolic))). The C assignment
statement depicts the addition of two variables and the
result is stored in a third variable, with a potential integer
overflow bug. For this statement, the information collected
by INTREPAIR is: (1) int result = varA + varB;, (2)
... (assert (= resSymbolic ( + varAsymbolic
varBsymbolic))); ... checksat, note that this SMT
constraint represents a part of the SMT system used to
detect the bug, (3) ID-Integer_Overflow_Bug, (4)
resSymbolic, and (5) and the varAsymbolic variable.
3.5.3 Select Constraint Values
INTREPAIR selects the relevant SMT constraint variables
based on the type of C language statement where the integer
overflow is detected. For example, consider assignment
x = a1 + a2; where the variable x and potentially the
variables a1 and a2 need to be taken into consideration, be-
cause these influence the occurrence of the integer overflow
directly.
The symbolic variable, i.e., resSymbolic, was selected
by INTREPAIR to be further constrained. This is done in
order to check if the code repair that will be generated
could remove the previously detected integer overflow bug.
For bug removal checking, the whole SMT constraint sys-
tem slice of this symbolic variable will be used. Note that
this constraint system was previously (before running the
bug removal analysis) determined during fault localization.
More specifically, this variable will overflow in case of using
too large values that cannot properly be stored in the result
variable. Note that depending on the complexity of the
analyzed statement, more or fewer variables can be taken
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into consideration in order to determine if the previously
detected integer overflow would further manifest after re-
constraining. This depends on how the selected symbolic
variables were re-constrained. The intuition is that the inte-
ger overflow can be detected before a certain variable will
overflow. This type of behavior is useful when generating
repairs that are constraining more than one program vari-
able. Finally, the selected variables will be used in the next
step when re-constraining the bounds during the checking
of SMT constraints of the SMT system. Note that this SMT
system was used upfront to detect the integer overflow.
3.5.4 Re-Compute the Bound Checking Constraints
In order to solve the problem of determining a suitable vari-
able range for avoiding an overflow, INTREPAIR applies a
specific technique for re-constraining the symbolic variable
which has overflown and which was selected in the previ-
ous step. The variable can be re-constrained after collecting
the program execution path constraints for a single program
execution path, which were used to check for the presence
of an integer overflow. The presence of an integer overflow
bug is indicated if for the selected SMT system the Z3 solver
reports SAT (satisfiable, integer overflow bug present).
INTREPAIR re-constraints (for example, through integer
upper bound negation) the variable(s) selected from the pre-
vious step in order to determine a potentially safe interval
which will not lead to a second integer overflow of the
symbolic variable. Note that other iterative techniques are
possible (i.e., iterating backwards through a vector (from
large to small values) of consecutive large values and
checking by selecting each value once as integer upper
bound if the check conditions will hold). The goal is to
determine if there is a second integer overflow if INTREPAIR
re-constraints the selected variables as mentioned above. For
this purpose, INTREPAIR will check in the next step if for the
new SMT constraint system it gets an UNSAT (unsatisfiable,
no integer overflow bug present) solver reply. The new con-
strained SMT will be composed of the old SMT constraint
system, which was used to detect the integer overflow,
complemented with the re-constrained SMT equations. If
INTREPAIR gets an UNSAT solver reply, then it determines
that there will be no integer overflow if it re-constraints the
selected variable(s) with the new constraints (e.g., variable
range negation, etc.) and as such the integer overflow can
be avoided. Finally, the information collected at this step
will be used in later steps.
3.5.5 Determine the Bug Type
For a unique detected overflow, INTREPAIR attributes a
report containing a unique bug identifier. Based on the
generated bug identifier (ID), INTREPAIR can determine
which bug type it currently deals with. This information
is extracted from data stored during step two. With this ID,
INTREPAIR checks in the list of currently supported checkers
to which checker this stored information belongs to and
determines which repair patterns can be used to repair the
previously detected bug. In this way, repair patterns usable
for other types of bugs will not be suggested when repairing
integer overflows.
3.5.6 Selecting Repair Pattern
Based on the previously determined bug identifier (ID), INT-
REPAIR selects the suitable repairs for this integer overflow
from the pool of repair patterns using the decision tree (see
Figure 3 for more details), as discussed next.
Pattern. The repair patterns of INTREPAIR need to ad-
dress the following challenges. Each pattern needs to incor-
porate complex conditions with multiple branches depend-
ing on the type of potentially overflowing code location. An
INTREPAIR pattern needs to be pre-classifiable for typical
code locations (i.e., statements) where it would best apply
depending on the AST of the buggy statement(s). Further,
each pattern needs to have at least two branches: (1) in the
case the check succeeds, and (2) in case the check does not
succeed for error logging. The pattern needs to have several
customizable components which can be altered during static
analysis with: context dependent values, mathematical func-
tions, or C functions extracted from the buggy statement.
As such, INTREPAIR’s repair patterns need to be nontrivial
fragments of incomplete code, which have to be versatile
and applicable to different integer overflow repair scenarios.
Patching. The repair patterns impose the following chal-
lenges on INTREPAIR’s patching process. After the program-
mer/developer selects a repair pattern, the automated re-
pair mechanism of INTREPAIR needs to be able (1) to extract
the components of the buggy statement such as variables,
functions (i.e., malloc, etc.) and reuse them for augmenting
the selected pattern; to achieve this, the patching mechanism
needs to be able to match these extracted components with
the parts of the pattern where these fit, (2) next, the patching
mechanism needs to be able to precisely incorporate the
buggy statement(s) inside the newly selected pattern, (3) the
patching mechanism needs to be able to precisely delete the
previous statement(s) where the bug was detected and to
rewrite the existing source file with the newly generated
repair pattern at the correct source code location. As a
consequence, the challenges imposed by the repair patterns
and INTREPAIR’s patching process are nontrivial and require
high precision during source code file rewriting.
Repair Pattern Description. INTREPAIR’s repair patterns
consist of C code skeletons where different repair parts will
be replaced with: (1) concrete values after their values have
been computed, (2) mathematical operations (e.g., division
by a value, etc.), and (3) standard C library functions.
Depending on the context, placeholder variables will be
replaced with corresponding mathematical functions such
as the square root function sqrt or other functions. In the
situation in which a mathematical function is used, INT-
REPAIR does not need to compute the value of the function
upfront (during static analysis) but rather leave this to be
computed later during symbolic execution analysis (repair
validation) or program runtime. This offers the advantage
that INTREPAIR does not need to be able to compute any
possible mathematical function.
Further, the code repair patterns used by INTREPAIR
are based on preconditions similar to IOC’s [14] checks
(see Section 3.2 for more details). These preconditions can
cover different types of mathematical operations such as
multiplication of numbers and addition of variables. At the
same time, the repair patterns are highly configurable and
versatile. For example, the programmer can easily change, if
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needed, the error handling function inside the repair pattern
or can extend the precondition such that it captures more
complex bug avoiding preconditions. This can be achieved
by modifying a few lines of code inside an existing pattern
or by creating a new pattern and defining the conditions
(i.e., depending on the structure of the AST of the statement
where the bug was detected) when such a pattern fits best.
Selecting Repair Patterns. For the sake of brevity, we
will describe the steps used for selecting a code repair based
on a C statement having three components, leftHandSide,
rightHandSide, and operator. However, INTREPAIR can
deal with more complex statements as well, see Figure 3 for
more details.
INTREPAIR follows the following steps to select a suitable
repair pattern. First, the code statement where the integer
overflow error was detected is divided into its compo-
nents based on its AST. For example the AST components
of a C statement such as int result = varA + varB;
are leftHandSide=varA, operator=+ and rightHand-
Side=varB. Second, a series of rules are checked against
the AST of the previous C statement as follows: (1) is left-
HandSide equal/different than rightHandSide, (2) what
type of operator do we have in the statement, and (3) how
many components does the statement have after the = sign,
and so on. Third, based on these rules the repair pattern
which satisfies the highest number of constraints will be
selected. Note that each repair pattern has a list of properties
(i.e., use when rightHandSide = leftHandSide and
operator = +, etc.) attached to it that are checked against
the above stated rules. This list of properties is statically
defined when the repair patterns were manually added to
the pool of available repairs inside INTREPAIR. Further, in
case there are more repair patterns that fulfill the same
number of rules, INTREPAIR selects the first repair pattern
occurring in the list. In case INTREPAIR cannot determine
the pattern selection criteria due to, for example, a complex
C language statement, then no repair will be proposed.
Finally, note that if needed this approach can be updated
such that all legitimate repair patterns will be proposed
and for each a repair can be generated, and selected with
a human-in-the-loop approach.
Repair Pattern Example. In the following, we present a
repair pattern used by INTREPAIR.
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1if(leftHandSide.equals(
2rightHandSide)&&
3operator.equals("*")) {
4...
5return "if(sqrt("+leftHandSide+") <= sqrt("+value4+") &&
6 -sqrt("+ rightHandSide+") >= -sqrt("+value5 +"))
7 "+"{"+"\n"+"\t"+"\t"+"\t"
8 +buggyStm10 + "\n }else{ \n"
9 +"FILE *fp=fopen (\"IO_"
10 +"error_log.txt\", + \"w+\");"
11 +"\n fprintf(fp, \"IO_ID:%s
12 +FileName:%s LineNumber:%d",
13 +FileName+","+IO_bug+","
14 +LineNumber+");"
15 +"\n fclose(fp);" + " }\n";
16}
Fig. 4: Repair pattern example.
Figure 4 represents a code repair pattern used by INT-
REPAIR during integer overflow error repairing. This code
repair pattern contains C code compatible snippets (shaded
in red color) interleaved with several stub variables which
will be replaced with concrete variables names, values or
mathematical functions depending on the type (depending
on its AST structure) of code statement containing the bug.
For example, the repair pattern depicted in Figure 4 will
be used by INTREPAIR when the leftHandSide equals
(i.e., string wise comparison) with the rightHandSide and
the operator equals (i.e., string wise comparison) to the
product operator ∗. After these checks have been performed,
the repair will be assembled as follows.
First, value4, value5 and buggyStm10 located at lines
5, 8, and 10 in Figure 4, are replaced with: (1) the squared
root of the currently selected integer upper bound value
value4 ← sqrt(2147483647), (2) the negated integer
upper bound value value5 ← -sqrt(2147483647),
and (3) the program code statement that contains the
previously detected integer overflow error buggyStm10
← int result = data * data;. Second, the variables
FileName, IO_bug and LineNumber located at lines 15-
16 in Figure 4 are replaced with concrete values obtained
during bug detection. Finally, note that: (1) other code repair
patterns can be selected and used based on the format of the
AST of the program buggy statement, (2) our technique can
be easily generalized to more complex C code statements
than the ones mentioned herein, and (3) each generated
repair can easily be customized to fit to different types of
integer overflow mitigation scenarios, i.e., error logging, etc.
3.5.7 Determine New Constraint System
In this step, INTREPAIR assembles the new SMT constraint
system which is used to determine if the previously detected
integer overflow is still present. During this step, INTREPAIR
takes the constraints determined at the previous step and
inserts them in the SMT constraint system which was used
to detect the integer overflow. Before inserting the new
constraints in the SMT system, INTREPAIR needs to remove
the original SMT constraints which were used to detect the
presence of the integer overflow. The decision which SMT
constraints have to be removed from the SMT system (used
to detect the integer overflow presence) is made based on
the modular aggregation of these SMT statements inside
the integer overflow checker in which these constraints
are put together. More precisely, since the SMT constraints
used to check for an integer overflow are added in the
integer overflow checker in an incremental manner, INT-
REPAIR can precisely determine which constraints can be
safely removed and replaced with new ones determined
at the previous step. Next, this SMT system will be fed
into the Z3 solver. In case the solver replies SAT, then the
constraints added represent valid constraints which can be
used to avoid the previously detected integer overflow. This
new SMT constraint system serves as ground truth w.r.t.
the fact that the integer overflow can be removed if certain
symbolic variables are re-constrained in an appropriate way.
Finally, note that the above-described symbolic variables
have concrete counterparts values, which will be inserted
inside the code repair when assembling it.
3.5.8 Generate Code Repair
This step consists of putting together the final code repair(s)
and saving them into a list in case multiple repairs are
suggested. After the repair components have been inserted
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3.5.8 Generate Code Repair
This step consists of putting together the final code repair(s)
and saving them into a list in case multiple repairs are
suggested. After the repair components have been inserted
into the previously selected code repair pattern, INTREPAIR
generates a C code repair which is syntactically correct, can
be compiled and can be further on edited after insertion
(if desired). Note, that INTREPAIR generates correct patches
w.r.t. the correctness definition provided in Section 1, which
essentially means that INTREPAIR re-checks the program
after a patch was applied in order to determine if the bug
was really removed, and the program behavior was not
changed.
3.6 Implementation
We have implemented the approach presented in Section 3
in a prototype named INTREPAIR. It is an Eclipse [15]
plugin based on Codan [23]. INTREPAIR consists of approx.
10 KLOC and is developed as an Eclipse plug-in mainly
because: (1) the Eclipse CDT API can be easily reused, (2)
a GUI is easily obtainable, and (3) the obtained tool can be
used in both online (during code typing) and off-line (after
finishing code typing) modes. Note that Codan [23] is used
by INTREPAIR to construct the program CFG, analyze the
program AST statements, and perform bottom-up traversals
by using a C program statement visitor in order to construct
SMT constraints. Three additional auxiliary tools are imple-
mented as well to work with INTREPAIR.
The assembled repair generated in Section 3.5.8 is sent
to the Eclipse language tool kit (LTK) API [17] based com-
ponent of our engine, which will assemble the repaired
code. The LTK component adds information on how to
position the repair in the buggy program such that the
integer overflow will not occur after the repair was inserted.
In case multiple repairs have been generated, INTREPAIR
saves these repairs in a list of repair candidates for the
previously detected integer overflow. Finally, the repair
which was selected by the programmer will be passed to
the INTREPAIR repair insertion component, which will create
two differential views (i.e., with the repair inserted in the file
containing the bug and without).
Next, due to paper length constraints, we only briefly
describe the three additional tools which we implemented
and which offer support to INTREPAIR during program
patching: (1) an Eclipse CDT projects generator tool which
is used for generating Eclipse CDT compatible projects, (2)
a source code refactoring tool based on the Eclipse LTK [17],
JFace [16], and Eclipse CDT [15], for inserting program
repairs, and (3) a test case generator tool which can help
to assess the accuracy of integer overflow detection using
test cases.
3.7 Graphical User Interface in an IDE
Figure 6 shows the INTREPAIR Graphics User Interface
(GUI). First, the integer overflow triggers a bug marker
depicted in the black bordered box with a yellow bug icon.
It means that on the C statement an integer overflow error
was detected. Second, by right clicking on this bug marker
the user can start the code re-factoring wizard. The code
Fig. 6: Screenshot of the GUI of INTREPAIR.
re-factoring wizard is composed of two windows. The first
window is used to make repair type decisions (currently
only in-place repairs are available). The second window
depicted in Figure 6 (in the background) contains a dif-
ferential files view visualizing the differences between the
original file containing the bug and the modified file with
the selected repair inserted. This second window helps the
developer to analyze the patch before it is applied. Finally,
it is possible to navigate between these two windows and in
case the programmer decides to insert the repair generated
in Section 3.5 then this can be achieved by left-clicking on
the Finish button.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of our experimental
evaluation and address the following research questions
(RQs):
• RQ1: How effective is INTREPAIR in repairing integer
overflows? To what extent does INTREPAIR produce
false positives?
• RQ2: To which degree does INTREPAIR ensure that
a repair completely removes the detected integer
overflow?
• RQ3: What is the performance impact of INTREPAIR?
• RQ4: How do the bug repairs of INTREPAIR preserve
program correctness?
• RQ5: How effective is INTREPAIR compared to man-
ual repair of integer overflows?
4.1 Evaluation Setup
Subject Prog. LOC # Programs Description
CWE-190 up to 638 2,052 Open source testsuite
Benchmark up to 20 KLOC 50 We introduce a benchmark
of synthetic programs
TABLE 1: Overview of the subject programs.
Table 1 depicts a summary of the programs used to
evaluate INTREPAIR. Next, we give details about the used
programs.
Juliet benchmark. First, we selected 2,052 C programs
contained in the SAMATE’s Juliet test suite [49], which is
the largest open source test suite for C/C++ code to the best
of our knowledge. In particular, we consider the CWE-190
category. Each program contains on average 476 LOC with a
maximum of 638 LOC. Each program has integer overflows:
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exactly one true positive and several false positives (see
characteristics of the Juliet test suite [49] for more details).
We used these program as they contain all possible program
control flows which may lead to an integer overflow and
further, these help to assess previously known faults in a
systematic way.
Synthesized Code. In addition, we build a benchmark
with 50 synthesized programs with complex control flows
and with a high number of code lines. In each synthesized
program, the exact number of seeded integer overflows is
known. The benchmark allows us to demonstrate that INT-
REPAIR can scale efficiently to large and complex programs.
The synthesis of programs is parameterized as follows: (1)
the total number of function calls, (2) the number of loop
iterations, and (3) each generated program contains exactly
one true positive and a variable number of false positives,
and the true positive should be located deep inside the
program, i.e., several thousands of branches nested inside
the program execution tree. Using these limits, we generate
50 programs ranging from 6 to 20 KLOC. The synthesis
algorithm iterates through several loops in which it adds
functions in the program which are calling each other. These
functions contain a variable number of branches which are
also counted until a certain depth is reached.
Statistics. Table 2 depicts several characteristics of the
2,052 analyzed programs contained in SAMATE’s
Subject
Prog.
Satisfiable
Paths
Unsatisfiable
Paths
Program
Branch
Nodes
Program
Branches
CWE-190 115 K. 1.2 Mil. 5.73 Mil. 12 Mil.
Benchmark 45 K. 0.7 Mil. 4.4 Mil. 8.8 Mil.
TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics of our subject programs.
Juliet test suite and the 50 programs of our bench-
mark. The programs contained in the CWE-190 contained
on average: 56 satisfiable paths, 584 unsatisfiable program
execution paths, and 5,800 program branches, which were
counted during program analysis. In contrast, the programs
contained in our own benchmark contained on average:
900 satisfiable paths, 14,000 unsatisfiable program execution
paths, and 28,000 program branches, which were counted
during the analysis of the programs.
User Study. We also performed a controlled experiment
with 30 participants in which we assessed the efficiency of
INTREPAIR during integer overflow repair. The used proto-
col is described in Section 4.6.
Experiment Setup. Experiments were conducted on a
Dell desktop with an Intel CPU Q9550 @ 2.83GHz, 64-bit,
12GB RAM, Eclipse IDE Kepler and OpenSuse 13.1 OS.
4.2 Effectiveness (RQ1)
As our main test-bed we select 2,052 C programs contained
in the NSA’s Juliet test suites [49] and 50 programs from our
customized benchmark.
Methodology. We prepare the 2,052 C programs in Juliet
in order to be handled by INTREPAIR. Further, we generate
2,052 test cases which are used to dynamically assess if the
detected integer overflow errors are detected at the correct
source code location. For the automated generation of these
test cases we used one of the tools presented in Section 3.6.
We do the same pre-process with the 50 programs from our
own benchmark.
(1) We assess the effectiveness of integer overflow de-
tection by running the generated test cases for all programs
(including the 2,052 C programs in the Juliet test suite and
50 C programs contained in our benchmark) and checking
the generated reports. More precisely, we checked whether
each report describes an integer overflow reported at the
expected location. (2) For those reports which are confirmed
as true positives INTREPAIR inserts a suitable repair into the
overflow site. (3) Then, INTREPAIR was run again in order
to check if this was a true positive and if the fault was
removed.
We point out that, for the assessed programs, INTREPAIR
did not detect any false positives. Further, INTREPAIR is able
to detect and repair all previously detected true positives
present in the analyzed programs without repairing any
false positives. Finally, note that the ground truth is that
each of the 2,052 C programs contains one true positive
and multiple false negatives and the same is true for the
programs contained in our benchmark.
Results. According to our experiments, INTREPAIR is able
to detect all integer overflows (2,052 overflows contained
in the Juliet test suite and 50 in our benchmark) at the ex-
pected locations in the analyzed programs. After the repairs
conducted by INTREPAIR, the integer overflow reports are
no longer generated. This means that INTREPAIR is able
to perfectly repair all integer overflows for the analyzed
programs.
4.3 Bug Removal (RQ2)
In this section, we explain how the integer overflows are
completely removed by INTREPAIR. Recall that INTREPAIR
checks if a bug was completely removed after a repair was
inserted in two operation modes.
Methodology. In this experiment, we use INTREPAIR’s
Manual Mode. In this mode, the user can again analyze the
repaired program by manually restarting the static analysis.
In case the symbolic analysis detects no other (or the previ-
ous fixed bug) integer overflow, then no bug report will be
generated. This helps the programmer to conclude that the
bug was completely removed and no new bug was inserted
into the program.
Actually, we use INTREPAIR to re-analyze each patched
program. For each of the repaired programs, we checked
if after the program was repaired any new bug report was
filed.
Results. After patching and subsequently reanalyzing
each program, no new overflow reports are generated,
meaning that the bugs are completely removed without
inserting new ones. For all programs, the errors were suc-
cessfully removed by inserting the repair at the correct
location.
4.4 Performance (RQ3)
In this section, we evaluate the performance of INTREPAIR
in three ways (1) the time INTREPAIR takes; (2) binary
size blow-up, and (3) the runtime overhead caused by the
overflow repair. Finally, we show that INTREPAIR has the
potential to scale to large programs as well.
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4.4.1 Static Analysis Time
The time that INTREPAIR spends in static analysis, i.e., static
symbolic execution and overflow repair processes, is an
important criterion to assess the usability of our tool.
6 KLOC Programs 46 sec. (< 1 Min.)
11 KLOC Programs 151 sec. (< 3 Min.)
20 KLOC Programs 567 sec. (< 10 Min.)
TABLE 3: Average repair generation time in seconds.
Results. Table 3 depicts the average execution time over
10 runs for each of the benchmark programs grouped in
three main categories based on their LOC. INTREPAIR han-
dles all programs under 10 Min. (567 sec.) on average.
Hence, we believe that INTREPAIR is time-effective and
usable in practice.
4.4.2 Binary Size Blow-up.
We assessed the source code and binary blow-up by count-
ing the increase in source code lines and in bytes for the
programs before and after applying the repairs.
First, we compared the total number of lines contained
in the source code against the number of lines of code
which were added after inserting all the repairs into the
2,052 vulnerable programs. As already mentioned, the initial
number of lines was 977.7 KLOC. After applying all repairs,
we added in total around 10,045 LOC.
Results. INTREPAIR yields a binary blow-up of less than
0.56% in LOC. In our opinion, this represents an acceptable
source code lines increase.
4.4.3 Execution Overhead.
We evaluated the runtime overhead introduced by INT-
REPAIR by comparing the execution time of unrepaired
programs against the one of the repaired programs.
Results. In our experiments, we recorded an average
runtime overhead of 1.57%. Thus, the inserted repairs do not
considerably influence the runtime overhead of the repaired
program.
4.5 Correctness (RQ4)
We validate the correctness of our repairs by checking that
our symbolic execution component generates semantically
different code. In other words, we want to find out if
the repairs can potentially influence the program behavior
and the repair correctly removes the bug (see our patch
correctness definition in Section 1 for more details).
To do so, we compare the generated SMT model before
and after the repair. For this, INTREPAIR’s symbolic execu-
tion component stores the SMT system which was used
to trigger the bug report. Next, this constraint system is
compared with the new SMT system which was generated
after repair validation. This results in the following analysis
process:
1) For all programs contained in our benchmark and
the Juliet test suite, we stored the SMT system for
each program and the node (i.e., source code line
number and file name) where the bug is located.
2) We applied the repair to the detected integer over-
flow by automatically rewriting the program.
3) We re-run the symbolic analysis on the patched
program and store the new SMT system.
4) We semantically checked each SMT system stored
at step (2) and each SMT system collected at step
(4) based on string comparison of the node with
another node, where a node is a complete statement,
e.g., x = p + 5. This enables INTREPAIR to detect
the differences between these two systems.
5) We compare the SMT system differences and pro-
ceeded as follows: (1) if the new SMT system only
reflects the semantics of the inserted repair: we
report no program correctness violation, (2) other-
wise, we reported that the program correctness will
potentially be affected by inserting this repair.
We automatically compared in total 225K SMT models
and all patched programs. These differ by up to five AST
nodes and by less than three SMT constraints on average,
respectively. Further, all checked SMT models differ only
with respect to the repair semantics and no additional
program semantics were introduced in the program due to
the repairs.
Additionally, we performed the following evaluation
process in order to increase the level of confidence w.r.t.
repair correctness.
Re-check Patched Program. We re-run the symbolic anal-
ysis, after applying the repair, on each of the programs in
order to see if there is a potential new integer overflow error
or the old one is still present in the repaired program.
Check Syntactical Program Correctness. We recompiled
(we used the GCC compiler) each of the programs to in-
vestigate if the repaired program is compilable and thus
syntactically correct. The compiler reported no syntactical
errors.
Results. The normal behavior of the repaired programs
does not change after applying the repairs, thus program
correctness is preserved.
4.6 User Study (RQ5)
In order to evaluate INTREPAIR’s efficiency w.r.t. integer
overflow repairing compared to manual repairing, we per-
formed a user study with 30 graduate students (16 males
and 14 females). They all had on average between 1-2 years
of industry programming experience.
Methodology. The experiment was conducted with each
participant individually at a single computer with an addi-
tional person in the room who overlooked the whole exper-
iment. The computer used in our experiment was equipped
with two versions of Eclipse CDT, i.e., one Eclipse version
with INTREPAIR installed and the other Eclipse version with-
out INTREPAIR installed. We split the 30 participants evenly
in two groups3. We randomly selected three programs from
our benchmark, and we told each participant of both groups
to search for a single integer overflow in each of the three
programs and to repair it. The participants were allowed
to read and execute the program. A debugger was not
available and no test case for executing the overflow was
provided. Further, all participants had similar experience
3. The number of females and males was split evenly between the
two groups.
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with the task at hand, particularly fault detection, as they
had 1-2 years of experience as developers in a software
company. Finally, in the case of manual debugging no test
cases where prepared for simplicity reasons. The experiment
supervisor assessed each bug detected manually by manual
inspection after this was reported by the experiment partic-
ipant.
Group 1. Each participant had access to the latest Eclipse
CDT IDE and to the GCC (v. 4.9.3) compiler [19] through
terminal access. The Eclipse CDT IDE in this group were
installed without INTREPAIR.
Group 2. Before the experiment, each participant from
this group got a short one minute demo movie showing
how to use INTREPAIR. Each participant could search for
bugs and fix them with the help of INTREPAIR.
We measured the time needed for each participant to
locate the bug and repair it and the success rate for each
analyzed program after the participant decided that he/she
was finished with all three programs at the end of their
analysis. After the experiment, we asked each participant
if (1) he/she would reuse INTREPAIR in his/her daily routine and
if (2) he/she would recommend it to other peers. Each question
could be answered with yes or no.
Results. (1) In total, the participants of Group 1 needed
6534 seconds (108 Min.) to repair the bugs in the experiment,
whereas participants from Group 2 only needed 362 seconds
(6 Min.) to repair them. That means, programmers using
INTREPAIR in our experiment were over 18 times (6534/362)
faster compared to relying on manual repair.
(2) We inspected the repairs inserted manually by Group
1 and those inserted by INTREPAIR. 41% of the manual
repairs were correct, i.e., the integer overflow bugs were
removed and no further vulnerabilities were introduced.
By construction, all the repairs with the help of INTREPAIR
were correct (see RQ2 for more details). Hence we conclude
that INTREPAIR is more effective w.r.t. overflow repair than
manual analysis.
(3) Out of the total participants of Group 2, 94% (14
participants) found INTREPAIR to be very useful and 87%
(13 participants) would further recommend INTREPAIR to
others.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity of our
experiments and the limitations of INTREPAIR.
5.1 Threats to Validity
Internal validity depends on the correctness of our proto-
type implementation and may be affected by the evaluation
setting and the execution of the conducted experiments.
To mitigate this, we carefully tested our prototype by re-
peating the experiments ten times and by taking average
performance values. To validate the correctness of our au-
tomatically generated patches, we re-ran the analysis on the
program after patching and inspected each program patch
manually in order to check for correctness.
External validity threats may derive from the selection
of programs which we used in our evaluation. We validated
our repairs on 2,052 programs and also on seeded programs
having up to 20 KLOC contained in our, especially for this
purpose designed, benchmark. In more complex applica-
tions, program repairs can dramatically increase the runtime
overhead when, for example, these reside in hot code such as
loops. Thus, different results could be obtained for different
analyzed programs.
Construct validity threats may appear from the fact that
our patches may introduce overhead or unwanted program
behavior. We point out that our repairs are suggested only
for code locations where previously an integer overflow was
confirmed. Further, our experiments show that our patches
do not harm performance in any significant way, do not
change program behavior, are automatically validated, and
are applicable only at previously confirmed bug locations.
5.2 Limitations
First, at this stage of development the used static symbolic
analysis framework (Codan) supports a subset of the C/C++
programming language semantics. Thus currently only cer-
tain types of statement and function headers can be handled
by INTREPAIR. Nevertheless, we do not consider this to be
a major limitation, adding all C/C++ statement types and
function headers can eliminate this. Investing sufficient time
and manpower can address this limitation.
Second, INTREPAIR’s implementation depends on pro-
gram loop and recursion depth unrolling which incurs well-
known precision penalties for all symbolic execution-based
techniques. These operations can introduce false positives
due to loop unrolling and recursion depth. Note that INT-
REPAIR does not produce false positives by design (i.e., each
detected fault is a genuine one). Our static analysis is time-
consuming. Its accuracy and performance will affect INT-
REPAIR’s results. INTREPAIR does not have access to runtime
information and a real environment is also not available. In
order to deal with this limitation, INTREPAIR uses function
stubs which can help to simulate the environment (interac-
tion with third-party libraries). Note that loop unrolling and
recursion depth have to be bounded when using symbolic
execution-based approaches in general since we want to
avoid the path explosion problem and thus infinite analysis
time. We want to address this potential insufficiency by
a prior analysis of program loops in order to derive loop
invariants. Further, we want to extend the list of currently
supported stub functions for the main C most used system
libraries.
Third, complex program expressions cannot be handled
due to limited support in the currently available open
source state-of-the-art of SMT solvers for non-linear compu-
tations. Thus, we want to address this potential limitation
by carefully providing SMT constraints which capture as
good as possible the original program constraints and by
experimenting with different SMT solvers.
Fourth, as INTREPAIR relies on static symbolic analysis of
source code it has several limitations which are common to
all static analysis techniques when comparing to dynamic
analysis techniques such as the well-known path explosion
problem. Note that static searching through the program
paths is different than dynamic path analysis where pro-
gram path coverage is driven by the provided program
input. We addressed this by implementing in INTREPAIR
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different path exploration techniques in order to analyze
first more error-prone paths.
Fifth, INTREPAIR’s evaluation is based on the currently
largest open source test suite for C/C++ programs, i.e., SA-
MATE’s Juliet test suite, due to the fact that it contains com-
plex control flows and a large number of situations where
integer overflow can occur. The programs contained in our
benchmark are comparable with real-world programs. As
a result, the findings of our evaluation do not necessarily
reflect the behavior of INTREPAIR when applied to larger
programs to some extent. However, we do not think that this
limits the applicability of INTREPAIR, since our tool is highly
scalable due to its configurable analysis. Further, we want
to evaluate INTREPAIR on even larger programs as well.
Finally, we tested INTREPAIR in a controlled experiment
with a restricted number of participants. For this reason
our findings may differ from industrial settings where real
development conditions are available. But we think that
our tool can help to drastically cut down the time needed
for bug detection and repair due to its usability and low
intrusiveness. Finally, we want to evaluate INTREPAIR also
in industry settings.
6 RELATED WORK
There is a large body of research work focusing on integer
overflow detection: ARCHER [9], UQBTng [53], PREfast [28],
Rich [3], SAGE [20], CBMC [10], IntScope [51], Brick [7],
IntFinder [6], SmartFuzz [37], PREfix [39], IntPatch [55],
IOC [14], IntFlow [44], SoupInt [50], SIFT [24], TAP [45],
Diode [46], Indio [56], Zhang et al. [54], and IntEQ [48].
In contrast, only few approaches focus explicitly on integer
overflow repairs: CIntFix [8], SoupInt [24], CodePhage [47],
TAP [45], and SIFT [24]. Out of these approaches, only
TAP [45] (technical report) and SIFT [24] first explicitly
detect the integer overflow and then repair it. The other
tools—which do not first confirm the bug existence—mostly
blindly change the code in all error prone locations in the
hope to avoid integer related problems. For example: (1)
CIntFix [8] utilizes integers of infinite size with two’s com-
plement encoding in place of original bounded integers, and
(2) AIC/CIT/RAO [11] relies on three code transformations:
add integer cast (AIC), replace arithmetic operator (RAO),
and change integer type (CIT) to change the program in
order to avoid integer overflows. However, in most cases
these tools are triggering high runtime overhead and have a
considerable likelihood of changing program behavior.
SIFT [24] first detects the integer overflow (bug detection
is based on Diode [46]) and then generates an input filter
to eliminate the bug at the binary level. Sift is a static
input filter generation tool, which inserts input filters in the
program binary for which the source code was previously
manually annotated with source code annotations. Sift relies
on tedious user source code annotations and cannot guaran-
tee that no unwanted program behavior is introduced since
the filters may remove only the integer overflows which
these cover.
In the above-mentioned approaches, fault localization is
performed before patch generation. In contrast, we combine
fault localization and patch generation, and as a result, we
obtain the capability of generating precise patches which
remove the bug for various program inputs (bug detection
is not program input independent) and at the exact location
where the bug was detected upfront. For this purpose,
we use SMT solving for bug localization. However, unlike
INTREPAIR, SMT solving is not used for repair synthesis by
TAP or Sift. As such, their bug removal process is bound
to a limited number of test inputs to confirm that the bug
was removed after the repair was inserted, which does not
guarantee that the bug was really removed for all possible
program inputs.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented INTREPAIR, a novel framework
which provides comprehensive integer overflow detection,
correct repair generation, and validation. To the best of our
knowledge, we provide the first static symbolic execution-
based technique that combines detection, generation and
validation of source code repairs for C programs. We applied
INTREPAIR to 2,052 C programs (approx. 1 million LOC)
and to 50 programs contained in our seeded benchmark,
which includes programs that have up to 20 KLOC. Our
experimental results show that INTREPAIR was able to effec-
tively detect integer overflows and successfully repair them
with source code patches. Our controlled experiment shows
that INTREPAIR is 18 times more time-effective and has a
higher repair success rate than manual repairs. Finally, we
will make INTREPAIR available as open source upon paper
acceptance.
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